Sunday 31 August 2014

Why Louis Freeh Should Be Investigated For 9/11 | 911Blogger.com

Why Louis Freeh Should Be Investigated For 9/11 | 911Blogger.com



Why Louis Freeh Should Be Investigated For 9/11


By Kevin Ryan


In the summer of 2001, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent
Robert Wright, a counterterrorism expert from the Chicago office, made
some startling claims about the Bureau in a written statement outlining
the difficulties he had doing his job.  Three months before 9/11, he
wrote: “The FBI has proven for the past decade it cannot identify and
prevent acts of terrorism against the United States and its citizens at
home and abroad.  Even worse, there is virtually no effort on the part
of the FBI’s International Terrorism Unit to neutralize known and
suspected terrorists residing within the United States.”[1]


Revelations since 9/11 have confirmed Wright’s claims.  FBI
management did little or nothing to stop terrorism in the decade before
9/11 and, in some cases, appeared to have supported terrorists.  This is
more disturbing considering that the power of the FBI over terrorism
investigations was supreme.  In 1998, the FBI’s strategic plan stated
that terrorist activities fell “almost exclusively within the
jurisdiction of the FBI” and that “the FBI has no higher priority than
to combat terrorism.”[2]


A
number of people are suspect in these failures, including the leaders
of the FBI’s counterterrorism programs.  But at the time of Wright’s
written complaint, which was not shared with the public until May 2002,
the man most responsible was Louis Freeh, Director of the FBI from 1993
to 2001.


Agent Wright was not FBI leadership’s only detractor, and not the
only one to criticize Freeh.  The public advocacy law firm Judicial
Watch, which prosecutes government abuse and corruption, rejoiced at the
news of Freeh’s May 2001 resignation.[3]  Judicial Watch pointed to a
“legacy of corruption” at the FBI under Freeh, listing the espionage
scandal at Los Alamos National Laboratories, as well as “Filegate, Waco,
the Ruby Ridge cover-up, the Olympic bombing frame-up of Richard
Jewell, [and] falsification of evidence concerning the Oklahoma City
bombing.”[4]


Judicial Watch said that Director Freeh believed he was above the
law.  The group went on to say that Freeh was “a man so corrupt he
destroyed the office he led, and a man so cowardly he refuses to face
the music for the illegalities he has allegedly committed.”[5]  To this
was added a claim that the FBI under Freeh was being directed by
sinister yet unknown forces.  ”In case after case throughout the 1990′s,
the FBI seems to have tailored its investigative efforts to fit
somebody’s pre-arranged script. The question is, who wrote that script —
and why?”


Freeh became FBI Director on July 19, 1993, just five months after
the first WTC bombing, three months after the Waco siege, and one day
before the alleged suicide of Hillary Clinton’s former Rose Law Firm
associate, deputy White House counsel Vincent Foster.  Freeh’s
predecessor was William Sessions.


Prior to his appointment by President Clinton, Freeh was a federal
judge.  He had been selected for that position by President George H.W.
Bush in 1991.  Before that, Freeh had been an Assistant District
Attorney for the Southern District of New York and an FBI field agent.


Freeh was involved with U.S. counter-terrorism efforts for many years
prior to his appointment as FBI Director in 1993.  As an FBI agent he
worked for the New York Field Office, which led the FBI’s
counterterrorism effort.  It was later the lead field office for Bin
Laden investigations and was the first to establish a Joint Terrorism
Task Force (JTTF) of state and federal law enforcement and intelligence
personnel.  Freeh worked there for seven years until he was promoted to
Assistant U.S. Attorney in 1981.  Throughout the 1980s, Freeh worked
with or for U.S. Attorney Rudy Giuliani, who was mayor of New York City
on 9/11.


Although Clinton was a Democrat, after his appointment as FBI
Director Freeh immediately began forming alliances with Republicans in
Congress. This apparently caused difficulty between the FBI and
Clinton’s White House.  Freeh also developed a secret relationship with
his former supporter, former President George H. W. Bush. He used that
relationship to communicate with the Saudi royal family without
Clinton’s knowledge.[6]


Ignoring or facilitating domestic terrorism


Just five months before Freeh’s appointment as FBI Director, the
World Trade Center (WTC) was bombed in an attack that killed six people
and wounded a thousand others.  It was blamed on a Pakistani-Kuwaiti by
the name of Ramzi Yousef, along with about half a dozen others. 
However, as the New York Times reported, it was clear that the FBI was somehow involved as well.


“Law-enforcement officials were told that terrorists were building a
bomb that was eventually used to blow up the World Trade Center, and
they planned to thwart the plotters by secretly substituting harmless
powder for the explosives, an informer said after the blast.


The informer was to have helped the plotters build the bomb and
supply the fake powder, but the plan was called off by an F.B.I.
supervisor who had other ideas about how the informer, Emad A. Salem,
should be used, the informer said.”[7]


The 1993 WTC bombing was a terrorist operation that had been
infiltrated by the FBI but the role that the FBI played in trying to
prevent that operation, or allow it to go forward, has never been
revealed.  What has been revealed is that forensic data was falsified
and “conclusions were altered to help the government’s case.”[8]  These
facts were revealed by Frederick Whitehurst, the chemist and supervisory
special agent in charge of the FBI’s crime lab who became a
whistleblower.  The altered conclusions that Whitehurst described were
made under the leadership of Louis Freeh.


A similar case occurred in April 1995, when the Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City (OKC) was bombed, killing 168 people including
19 children.  Investigators have since learned that the FBI played a
role in that bombing as well.  Reasons that the OKC bombing was
suspicious include the fact that there were secondary explosives found
in the building that were not reported as part of the official account.
 And as with the events of 9/11, the FBI immediately confiscated, and
refused to release, security videos that would have revealed what
actually happened.[9]


Freeh’s colleague and personal friend, Larry Potts, was the FBI
supervisor who was responsible for the tragedies at Ruby Ridge in 1992,
and Waco in 1993.  Potts was then given responsibility for investigating
the Oklahoma City bombing.[10]  Later it was claimed by one of the
convicted conspirators that lead bomber Timothy McVeigh was actually
acting under the direction of Potts.[11]  As an apparent reward for
Potts’ performance, in May 1995 Freeh promoted him to be his number two
man as Deputy Director of the FBI.  Two months later, Freeh removed
Potts from that position due to public outrage at the appointment.


On the FBI links to the OKC bombing, author Peter Dale Scott wrote —
“One such case of a penetrated operation “gone wrong” in 1993 might be
attributed to confusion, bureaucratic incompetence, or the problems of
determining when sufficient evidence had been gathered to justify
arrests. A repeated catastrophe two years later raises the question
whether the lethal outcome was not intended.”[12].


The result of the OKC bombing in governmental terms was the passage
of a new anti–terrorism law in April 1996.  This was a bill that would
be mirrored by the USA Patriot Act six years later, and it was described
as representing an assault on civil liberties.  The Houston Chronicle called the bill a “frightening” and “grievous” attack on domestic freedoms. But Louis Freeh supported it.


Because many Congressional representatives opposed the bill, it was
passed only after having been watered down.  In Freeh’s words, it had
been “stripped… of just about every meaningful provision.”[13]  Freeh’s
call for this legislation to be more restrictive of civil liberties must
be considered with the fact that his agency was accused of facilitating
the event that precipitated the legislation.


One of the obstacles often cited as a root cause for the FBI not
doing its anti-terrorism job effectively was “the Wall.”  This was a set
of procedures that restricted the flow of information between law
enforcement officers pursuing criminal investigations and officers
pursuing intelligence information via the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA).  The procedures, set out in a 1995 memo from
deputy attorney general (and future 9/11 Commissioner) Jamie Gorelick,
were seemingly intended to prevent the loss of evidence, due to
technicalities, that might be obtained via a FISA warrant.[14]  Because
such losses were never actually experienced, later claims about “the
Wall” appear to be weak excuses to explain why information was not
shared or actions were not taken.


In July 1996, TWA Flight 800 crashed into the Atlantic Ocean just
after taking off from JFK Airport in New York, killing all 230 people on
board.  Freeh later claimed that “No one knew what brought it
down.”[15]  Curiously, the FBI took over the investigation despite the
fact that the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) had priority
over the investigation as established by law.  FBI agents then blocked
attempts by the NTSB to interview witnesses.[16]


One month after the explosion, chemists at the FBI crime laboratory
in Washington found traces of PETN, an explosive component of bombs and
surface-to-air missiles, in the wreckage.[17]  Despite this, in November
1997, the FBI closed its investigation and announced that “No evidence
has been found which would indicate that a criminal act was the cause of
the tragedy of TWA flight 800.”[18]


This reversal of findings was led by Freeh and Jamie Gorelick.  After
meeting with Freeh and Gorelick, James Kallstrom, the agent in charge
of the New York office where the TWA 800 investigation was being
handled, produced several unlikely explanations for the detection of the
PETN.  Although none of these hypotheses was probable, the FBI was able
to convince the media to change the story.[19]


Louis Freeh was leading the FBI during the investigation into the
1993 WTC bombing, at the time of the OKC bombing, and at the time of the
crash of TWA Flight 800.  All of these events suggest the facilitation,
or cover-up, of terrorist acts by the FBI.  However, these were not the
only indications that Louis Freeh was leading an agency that
facilitated terrorism.


Ignoring or facilitating “Islamic” terrorism


Before leaving his position in the summer of 2001, Freeh was
responsible for overseeing more than a dozen failures related to
“Islamic” terrorism and the alleged 9/11 hijackers.  Here are the first
nine.



  1. Between 1989 and 1998, Ali Mohamed was an FBI informant. He was also a
    U.S. Army Special Forces sergeant and al Qaeda’s primary trainer.[20] 
    According to U.S. Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald, Mohamed “trained most of
    al Qaeda’s top leadership – including Bin Laden and Zawahiri – and most
    of al Qaeda’s top trainers. He gave some training to persons who would
    later carry out the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.”[21]  Mohamed had
    been an FBI informant, since at least 1992, and was previously a CIA
    “contract agent.”  In a move indicative of U.S. oversight, he
    transitioned directly from the U.S. Special Forces to fighting and
    training the Mujahideen in Afghanistan.[22]  When he was arrested in
    1998, Mohamed was allowed to plea bargain and, to this day, he has never
    been brought to trial.

  2. In early 1995, Freeh was behind the cancelation of a raid on a
    suspected terrorist-financing organization.  Recent legislation had
    enabled plans for the raid and prosecution of The Holy Land Foundation
    in Arlington, Texas, a suspected terrorist financing operation.  But
    Freeh stopped the raid using the dubious excuse that it would alienate
    Arabs in the United States.[23]  Holy Land was finally raided just after
    9/11 and, years later, it was convicted of providing material support
    to a terrorist organization.[24]

  3. In May 1995, FBI agents wrote a memo about what they had learned in
    their interrogation of Abdul Hakim Murad, a Kuwaiti who allegedly helped
    bomb the WTC in 1993.  Murad told the FBI about another plan to hijack
    multiple airliners in Asia and crash them into buildings in the U.S.,
    including the WTC.  Inexplicably, the FBI memo omitted all of the
    details the agents had learned about this plot, called Operation
    Bojinka.[25]  In 1996, Murad was convicted of crimes related to Bojinka
    yet, as author Peter Lance wrote, the FBI seemed to be “go out of its
    way to avoid even a hint of the plot that was ultimately carried out on
    9/11.”[26]

  4. Gregory Scarpa Jr was an organized crime figure who, when imprisoned
    for an unrelated crime in 1996, was located in a cell between Ramzi
    Yousef and Abdul Hakim Murad.  Working undercover for the FBI, Scarpa
    was able to gain significant information about an active al Qaeda cell
    in New York City, and a “treasure trove of al Qaeda plans.”  After
    working closely with Scarpa to gain the intelligence, Freeh and his
    subordinates ended up calling the whole thing a “hoax” and buried the
    information. [27]

  5. On May 15, 1998, an FBI pilot sent his supervisor in the Oklahoma City
    FBI office a memo, warning that he had observed “large numbers of
    Middle Eastern males receiving flight training at Oklahoma airports in
    recent months.”  The memo went on to suggest that these people were
    planning terrorist activities.  It was sent to the Bureau’s Weapons of
    Mass Destruction unit but no action was ever taken.[28]

  6. In September 1999, FBI agents showed up at Airman Flight School in
    Norman, OK, to investigate the school’s training of Ihab Ali Nawawi. A
    suspect in the 1998 embassy bombings who was allegedly the personal
    pilot of Osama bin Laden, Nawawi had been arrested in Orlando four
    months before.[29]  He has been in U.S. custody ever since but has never
    been brought to trial.  Despite the investigation of Nawawi and the
    1998 warning from an OKC FBI pilot, the FBI apparently never thought to
    keep a closer eye on Airman Flight School.  Zacarias Moussaoui and
    several alleged 9/11 hijackers trained or were seen at the school in
    2000 and 2001.

  7. In October 1999, Hani El-Sayegh, a suspect in the 1996 Khobar Towers
    Bombing, was deported from a prison in Atlanta to Saudi Arabia.  This
    was the result of an agreement between Freeh and Prince Naif, Saudi
    Arabia’s interior minister. After his deportation, El-Sayegh was
    reportedly tortured as FBI agents watched and submitted questions to his
    Saudi interrogators. David Vine from the Washington Post
    remarked — “Such practices are sharply at odds with Freeh’s oft-stated
    message about the FBI’s need to respect human dignity and the tenets of
    democracy while fighting crime.”[30]  Another problem with this incident
    was that the U.S. had control over a suspect in the 1996 terrorist
    murder of 19 U.S. servicemen and yet, instead of bringing that suspect
    to trial, they sent him back to Saudi Arabia. A reporter from Time magazine
    expressed the problem this way: “Run that one by again: The United
    States doesn’t want to try a man suspected of a bomb attack that killed
    Americans—and they’re sending him home?!”[31]  It is presumed that
    El-Sayegh was ultimately executed by the Saudis.[32]

  8. In April 2000, a Pakistani from England named Niaz Khan told the FBI
    that he was recruited by al Qaeda, trained in Pakistan to hijack planes
    and sent to the U.S. for a terror mission, as were several pilots.  Khan
    said that he told the FBI, about a year before 9/11, that al Qaeda
    planned to hijack airliners in the United States.[33]  The FBI confirmed
    that Khan passed two polygraphs. Yet FBI headquarters supposedly didn‘t
    believe Khan and sent him home to London.

  9. When two of the alleged 9/11 hijackers, Khalid Al-Mihdhar and Nawaf
    Al-Hazmi, came to the U.S. in January 2000, they immediately met with
    Omar Al-Bayoumi, a suspected Saudi government spy and an employee of a
    Saudi aviation company.  Al-Bayoumi, who had been the subject of an FBI
    investigation in 1998 and 1999, became a very good friend to the two
    alleged hijackers, setting them up in an apartment and paying their
    rent.[34]  Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi then moved in with a long-time FBI
    asset, Abdussattar Shaikh, who had been working closely with the Bureau
    on terrorism cases since 1994.  Apparently the FBI was not able to make a
    timely connection between its suspect Al-Bayoumi or its informant
    Shaikh and the two alleged 9/11 hijackers they supported for two years
    prior to 9/11.  In 2003, the FBI gave Shaikh $100,000 and closed his
    contract.[35]
From these nine incidents, we know that FBI management under Freeh
was not working to prevent “Islamic” terrorism in the years before
9/11.  These examples also suggest that the FBI was suppressing and
ignoring information about terrorism, perhaps for the purpose of
protecting or co-opting the related terrorist networks.  As for al
Qaeda, author Lawrence Wright wrote that, in the late 1990s, “Director
Freeh repeatedly stressed in White House meetings that al Qaeda posed no
domestic threat. Bin Laden didn’t even make the FBI’s most wanted list
until June 1999,” nearly a year after the embassy bombings.[36]


Robert Hanssen, a veteran FBI counterintelligence agent, was arrested
for espionage in February 2001.[37]  Freeh claimed the CIA and FBI
worked very well together to catch Hanssen.  Apparently there was no
difficulty, of the type later cited by the 9/11 Commission, that
prevented collaboration between the two agencies.


It was claimed that Hanssen, while betraying his country for
financial gain, sold a special software program called PROMIS to the
Russians.  William Hamilton, the president of Inslaw, the company that
manufactured PROMIS, said that the Russians then sold the program to
Osama bin Laden and that it might have played a part in facilitating the
9/11 attacks.[38]  This claim was also reported by The Washington Times and
it was said that the software would have given Bin Laden the ability to
monitor US efforts to track him down and also the ability to monitor
electronic-banking transactions, enabling money-laundering
operations.[39]


PROMIS had a history going back over two decades.  In the 1980s,
Oliver North of Iran-Contra fame had used the software to create lists
of national security threats in conjunction with the secretive
Continuity of Government (COG) program.  In an interesting coincidence,
before his death British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook told the House of
Commons that “Al Qaeda” was not really a terrorist group but a database
of international Mujahideen and arms smugglers used by the CIA and
Saudis.[40]


The Justice Department oversight committee on the use of PROMIS
included Rudy Giuliani and, therefore presumably, Louis Freeh.  The
lawyer for Inslaw, in its legal dealings with the Justice Department,
was Roderick M. Hills, who would shortly thereafter be Frank Carlucci’s
boss at Sears World Trade.


Investigator Michael Ruppert and his colleagues have proposed that
software programs evolving from PROMIS were used on 9/11 to disable the
U.S. air defenses.  This hypothesis involves Mitre Corporation and its
contractor PTech, which were known to be operating at the Pentagon on
projects that affected the operability of Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) systems.[41]  It is not clear how a database
program might have evolved into an executable aviation control program,
but there are other reasons to consider PTech.


After 9/11, the FBI did not report known links between PTech and its
Saudi investor Yassin al Qadi to the U.S. Customs Department
investigation into terrorist financing.  This concealment was despite
PTech having contracts with many U.S. agencies controlling sensitive
information, including the FBI, and Al-Qadi being declared a terrorist
financier.  It is also known that PTech director Yaqub Mirza had
contacts at high levels within the FBI.[42]


Working for the Bush Administration


The month before Hanssen’s arrest, George W. Bush was inaugurated as
President. The only cabinet-level figure to be retained from the
outgoing Clinton administration was CIA Director George Tenet, who was
said to be a long-time friend of George H. W. Bush. But Freeh stayed on
as well until his unexpected resignation in May that year.  Freeh did
not give specific reasons for leaving at the time and he remained in the
position until June 25.


Having been FBI Director for eight years, Freeh had put most of the
FBI’s leadership in place.  This included his deputy as of 1999, Thomas
Pickard, who would go on to be acting director of the FBI from June to
September 2001.  It also included Dale Watson, head of the FBI’s
counterterrorism program as of 1999, and the people in his
organization.  Watson had worked with Freeh in the New York FBI office
years before and had worked on the investigations into the U.S. embassy
bombings and the bombing of the USS Cole.  Between FBI assignments, in 1996 and 1997, Watson had been the Deputy Chief of the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center.


Working for Watson in the FBI’s counterterrorism division was Michel
Rolince, the head of the International Terrorism Operations Section
(ITOS).  Under Rolince were the heads of the Usama Bin laden Unit (UBLU)
and the Radical Fundamentalism Unit (RFU).


Three major FBI failures relating to “Islamic” terrorism occurred during the early months of 2001.



  1. The first was on March 7, 2001 when, during trial proceedings for the
    1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Africa, FBI agent Stephen Gaudin read
    aloud in court a phone number that had been used by the alleged al Qaeda
    plotters to plan and execute the embassy attacks.[43]  This was the
    phone number of the “Yemen Hub,” which doubled as the home phone of
    Ahmed Al-Hada, the father-in-law of alleged 9/11 hijacker Khalid
    Al-Mihdhar.  According to U.S. officials, the same phone was purportedly
    used for planning the USS Cole bombing and, later, the 9/11 attacks.  The phone number was also published in the British weekly the Observer, just five weeks before 9/11.  As author Kevin Fenton wrote: “Any of the Observer’s
    readers could have called the number and asked for a message to be
    forwarded to Osama bin Laden.”[44]  This widely reported FBI gaffe
    should have alerted al Qaeda to U.S. knowledge of its secret Yemen
    operations center while also ensuring that anyone listening would know
    the exact al Qaeda phone number being monitored by U.S. intelligence.
    Despite this major tip-off, al Qaeda continued to use the phone to plan
    the 9/11 attacks, until “only weeks before 9/11.”[45]  Why did the
    Bureau not work to intercept the calls made in the months and weeks
    before 9/11 and use them to help stop the attacks?

  2. The FBI had Mohamed Atta and one of his colleagues under surveillance
    in early 2001, according to an FBI informant.  The informant later said
    he was a “million percent positive” that the 9/11 attacks could have
    been stopped if the FBI had gone after Atta at the time.  Instead, FBI
    handlers steered the informant away from Atta.[46]

  3. Several FBI agents, including Dina Corsi, Margaret Gillespie, Doug
    Miller and Mark Rossini, were involved in a concerted attempt to hide
    information about Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi from other intelligence
    officers who almost certainly would have captured the suspects.  These
    acts of inexplicable secrecy included not sharing cables on the subject,
    not sharing photographs of the suspects, misrepresenting “the Wall”
    restrictions, and misrepresenting comments from the National Security
    Law Unit.[47]
The FBI agents noted in the last example were all assigned as
liaisons to the CIA’s Alec Station unit, focused on Osama Bin Laden.  It
is interesting that neither Richard Blee, the head of that unit at the
time, nor Rodney Middelton, the head of the FBI’s UBLU, were ever
interviewed by independent journalists about these critical issues. 
Middleton left the FBI the day before 9/11, and Blee went on to be named
CIA station chief in Kabul as the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan began.


Between April and September 2001, several major changes occurred in
the FBI’s counterterrorism program.  In May, the head of the RFU was
replaced by Dave Frasca, who would go on to be a central character in
the obstruction of opportunities to identify and capture the alleged
hijackers.  At the same time, Louis Freeh announced his resignation
despite not having another job.


Freeh left the FBI on June 25, 2001 with nowhere to go.  It was said
that he approached acting New Jersey Governor Donald DiFrancesco and
offered to serve, without salary, as the state’s anti-terrorism “czar”. 
This would have brought Freeh close to the 9/11 attacks in NYC but it
didn’t happen.  Instead, Freeh was apparently doing nothing for the
three months before 9/11, or at least doing nothing that we know about.
Freeh then took a job as director, counsel, and ethics officer at credit
card issuer MBNA.


The final three 9/11-related failures that can be attributed to
Freeh, through the subordinates he put in place, are as follows.  If any
of these had been handled appropriately, the alleged 9/11 hijackers
would have been caught and their alleged plans foiled.



  1. On July 10, 2001, Phoenix FBI counterterrorism agent Ken Williams sent
    FBI headquarters what is called the “Phoenix Memo,” warning that Osama
    bin Laden was sending students to U.S. flight schools.  Williams listed
    cases of suspected Arab extremists training in Arizona flight schools
    and urged the FBI to search for such cases in other cities.  The FBI
    failed to respond to the memo at all and it was dismissed as
    speculative.  As 9/11 Commissioner Bob Kerrey would later point out
    about the memo – “had it gotten into the works at the—up to the highest
    possible level, at the very least, 19 guys wouldn‘t have gotten onto
    these airplanes with room to spare.”[48]

  2. In mid-August 2001, Zacarias Moussaoui was arrested in Minnesota.  The
    FBI agents who made the arrest called Moussaoui a “suspected airline
    suicide attacker.”  The agents requested permission to search
    Moussaoui’s belongings, including his laptop computer, but they were
    denied that permission.  A week later the FBI supervisor in Minneapolis,
    trying to get the attention of those at FBI headquarters, said he was
    trying to make sure that Moussaoui — “did not take control of a plane
    and fly it into the World Trade Center.”[49]  Still, FBI headquarters
    denied the field agents’ requests.  In May 2002, one of the agents,
    Coleen Rowley, described this obstruction.  She wrote that FBI
    headquarters personnel – …continued to, almost
    inexplicably, throw up roadblocks and undermine Minneapolis’ by-now
    desperate efforts to obtain a FISA search warrant, long after the French
    intelligence service provided its information and probable cause became
    clear. HQ personnel brought up almost ridiculous questions in their
    apparent efforts to undermine the probable cause.  In all of their
    conversations and correspondence, HQ personnel never disclosed to the
    Minneapolis agents that the Phoenix Division had, only approximately
    three weeks earlier, warned of Al Qaeda operatives in flight schools
    seeking flight training for terrorist purposes!  Nor did FBIHQ personnel
    do much to disseminate the information about Moussaoui to other
    appropriate intelligence/law enforcement authorities. When, in a
    desperate 11th hour measure to bypass the FBIHQ roadblock, the
    Minneapolis Division undertook to directly notify the CIA’s Counter
    Terrorist Center (CTC), FBIHQ personnel actually chastised the
    Minneapolis agents for making the direct notification without their
    approval!
    ”[50]

  3. Finally, on August 23, 2001, less than three weeks before 9/11, the
    CIA formally told the FBI that Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi might be in the
    United States.  But even though the two alleged hijackers had their
    names listed in the San Diego phone book and had been living with an FBI
    informant, the Bureau supposedly could not find them.
FBI agent Robert Fuller, only recently transferred to UBLU, claimed
to take the August information and use it to search databases looking
for Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi but he claims to have found nothing.  Fuller
had another JTTF officer help him to search a database run by
Choicepoint, the company known for purging Florida voters in the 2000
presidential election.[51]  The Justice Department IG report says Fuller
did an NCIC criminal history check, credit checks, and a motor vehicle
records search.  But the 9/11 Commission Report clearly contradicted
this, saying “Searches of readily available databases could have
unearthed the drivers licenses, the car registration, and the telephone
listing” all of which were in Al Mihdhar and Al Hazmi’s names.[52]


Later it was noted that “the hijackers had contact with 14 people
known to the FBI because of counterterror investigations prior to
9/11.”[53]  This was known to the 9/11 Commission as the staff director
for 9/11 Commission made a clear statement about how close the FBI was
to catching the alleged hijackers.  “Rather than the hijackers being
invisible to the FBI, they were, in fact, right in the middle of the
FBI‘s counterterrorism coverage,” said Eleanor Hill.  “And yet, the FBI
didn‘t detect them.”[54]


All of this certainly seems to suggest that FBI headquarters and
Director Freeh had sufficient information to track and capture the
alleged 9/11 hijackers.  Freeh’s close association with the Saudis is
also troubling considering the role of suspected Saudi spy Al-Bayoumi. 
The company Al-Bayoumi worked for, Dalla Al-Baraka, was owned by Saleh
Abdullah Kamel, an alleged member of the “Golden Chain” financiers of
Osama bin Laden. And the wife of Freeh’s friend Prince Bandar was
reported to have sent funding to the alleged hijackers through
Al-Bayoumi’s wife.[55]


In his resignation speech, Freeh praised the integrity of George W.
Bush and dedication of Dick Cheney.  “President Bush has brought great
honor and integrity to the Oval Office.  It was equally an honor to be
appointed by his father to serve as a federal judge.  I also wish to
thank Vice President Dick Cheney for conducting an effective transition
process and for his dedication to duty in serving the Nation,” said
Freeh.[56]


Going on, Freeh thanked his colleagues at the CIA and emphasized how
well the two agencies had worked together.  “Through the leadership of
Director George Tenet, we have forged an unprecedented relationship with
the men and women of the Central Intelligence Agency in the
counter-intelligence and counter-terrorism arenas,” he claimed.  “This,
in turn, has enabled us to place greater emphasis on
counter-intelligence [and] counter-terrorism.”[57]


These remarks are in direct contradiction to the 9/11 Commission Report,
which placed blame for the failure to track down and capture the
alleged hijackers on two root causes.  The first was that, although the
“system was blinking red,” the intelligence communities were not working
well together, partly because of “the Wall” of procedures that
supposedly prevented adequate information sharing between the agencies. 
The second presumed root cause was that the information needed to stop
the attacks did not rise high enough within the FBI and CIA to ensure
action would be taken.  Neither of these excuses is believable, given
the examples already reviewed.


At the end of Freeh’s tenure as director, the FBI was under severe
criticism from all directions.  Patrick J. Leahy, the chairman of the
Senate Judiciary Committee whose office would a few months later be one
of the targets of the anthrax attacks, said, “There are some very, very
serious management problems at the FBI.”[58]  Richard J. Durbin, a
Democrat from Illinois, said, “It’s hard to believe the situation has
deteriorated and disintegrated the way it has. How did this great agency
fall so far so fast? The FBI has been starved for leadership.”[59]


Nine days after Freeh announced his retirement, the FBI told Timothy
McVeigh’s attorneys that it had failed to give them about 3,000 pages of
documents related to the OKC bombing investigation.  “Self-righteous
and sanctimonious, Freeh never admitted a personal mistake. He never
pointed out his own role in the McVeigh debacle.”[60]


If there is nothing to hide, why hide it?


Testifying before the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry in October 2002,
Freeh said: “I am aware of nothing that to me demonstrates that the FBI
and the intelligence community had the type of information or tactical
intelligence which could have prevented September 11th. In terms of the
FBI’s capability to identify, investigate and prevent the nineteen
hijackers from carrying out their attacks, the facts so far on the
public record do not support the conclusion that these tragic events
could have been prevented by the FBI and intelligence community acting
by themselves.”[61]


This assessment contradicts that of FBI agent Robert Wright, whose
written warning prior to 9/11 was ignored.  Wright later stated that: 
“September the 11th is a direct result of the incompetence of the FBI’s
International Terrorism Unit. No doubt about that.  Absolutely no doubt
about that. You can’t know the things I know and not go public.” Agent
Wright was prohibited by the U.S. Justice Department from telling all he
knew about the pre-9/11 FBI failures.  But he added: “There’s so much
more. God, there’s so much more. A lot more.”[62]


Why did the FBI, if it had nothing to hide, go into full-blown
cover-up mode immediately after the attacks?  For example, FBI agents
confiscated all of the surveillance videos which would have shown what
happened at the Pentagon.[63]  The Bureau harassed witnesses in Florida
who suggested that the allege hijackers were not the devout Muslims the
official account made them out to be.[64]  In Pennsylvania, FBI agents
took control of the United 93 crash site and intentionally ignored
eyewitness testimony that contradicted the official account.[65]  At the
WTC debris collection site, FBI agents were caught stealing
evidence.[66]


The FBI also went to great lengths to avoid cooperating with the
Joint Congressional Inquiry.  For example, the Bureau refused to allow
the interviewing or deposing of Abdussatar Shaikh, the FBI informant who
had lived with alleged hijackers Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi.[67]  Through
the FBI’s maneuvering, Shaikh was never required to testify.  The FBI
also tried to prevent the testimony of Shaikh’s FBI handler, which
occurred only secretly at a later date.


The protection of Abdusttar Shaikh by the FBI makes no sense
considering that the Bureau encouraged the torture of other suspects,
like Hani El-Sayegh.  Alleged al Qaeda associate Abu Zubaydah, who was
later found to have nothing to do with al Qaeda, had already been
tortured many times to gain information related to 9/11 while Shaikh was
allowed to negotiate his entire removal from the 9/11
investigation.[68]


The FBI also failed to cooperate with the 9/11 Commission.  According
to author Philip Shenon, the FBI was “as uncooperative with the 9/11
Commission as it had been in the Congressional investigation” and was
“painfully slow to meet the Commission’s initial request for documents
and interviews.”[69]


The only reasonable explanation for FBI management’s behavior in the
decade before 9/11 and in the ensuing investigations is that they were
somehow complicit in the attacks. But why would Freeh and the FBI want
to support the activities of alleged terrorists?


We know that the accused 19 hijackers could not have accomplished
most of what needs explaining about 9/11.  They could not have disabled
the U.S. air defenses for two hours, they could not have made the U.S.
chain of command fail to respond appropriately, and they could not have
caused the destruction of the three tall buildings at the WTC.  However,
the myth of al Qaeda was a necessary part of the official account and
was able to provide a grain of truth in an otherwise unbelievable story.


In 2006, Freeh joined George Tenet on the board of a company that had
been flagged, but never investigated, for 9/11 insider trading.[70]  He
also became the personal attorney for Saudi Prince Bandar who, as
stated before, was implicated through his wife in financing of the
alleged hijackers.  Recently he has been trotted out to pass judgment on
the late coach Joe Paterno.  But he is in no position to pass judgment
on others.


Under Louis Freeh, the FBI failed miserably at preventing terrorism
when preventing terrorism was the FBI’s primary goal.  Moreover, the
actions of FBI management suggest that it was facilitating and
covering-up acts of terrorism throughout the time that Freeh was the
Bureau’s director.  Fifteen examples have been cited here from the time
of Freeh’s tenure and three other examples were given from the time just
after he left, when it was unclear why he left or what he was doing. 
Add to these examples the fact that the FBI took extraordinary measures
to hide evidence related to the 9/11 attacks and it becomes startling
clear that Mr. Freeh should be a prime suspect in any honest
investigation.



[1] Wikipedia page for Robert Wright Jr, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Wright,_Jr.


[2] Statement of Louis J. Freeh, Former FBI Director, before the Joint Intelligence Committees, October 8, 2002, http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002_hr/100802freeh.pdf


[3] News Release, JUDICIAL WATCH REJOICES AT RESIGNATION OF FBI DIRECTOR LOUIS FREEH, May 3, 2001, http://www.judicialwatch.org/archive/2001/printer_921.shtml


[4] Ibid


[5] Judicial Watch press release, U.S. Supremes Rule in Favor of JW, http://www.judicialwatch.org/archive/newsletter/2003/0203b.shtml


[6] Joseph J. Trento, Prelude to Terror: Edwin P. Wilson and the
Legacy of America’s Private Intelligence Network, Carroll & Graf,
2005, p 351


[7] Ralph Blumenthal, “Tapes Depict Proposal to Thwart Bomb Used in Trade Center Blast,” New York Times, October 28, 1993


[8] Pierre Thomas and Mike Mills, FBI Crime Laboratory Being Probed, The Washington Post, September 14, 1995


[9] See the film A Noble Lie: Oklahoma City 1995, http://www.anoblelie.com/


[10] Stephen Labaton, Man in the Background at the F.B.I. Now Draws Some Unwelcome Attention, The New York Times, May 28, 1995


[11] Geoffrey Fattah, Nichols says bombing was FBI op, Deseret News, February 22, 2007


[12] Peter Dale Scott, Systemic Destabilization in Recent American
History: 9/11, the JFK Assassination, and the Oklahoma City Bombing as a
Strategy of Tension, The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, September,
2012


[13] Alasdair Scott Roberts, The Collapse of Fortress Bush: The
Crisis of Authority in American Government, NYU Press, 2008, p 35


[14] April 1995 memo from Jamie Gorelick outlining the “Wall” procedures, http://old.nationalreview.com/document/document_1995_gorelick_memo.pdf


[15] Louis J. Freeh, My FBI: Bringing Down the Mafia, Investigating
Bill Clinton, and Fighting the War on Terror, MacMillan, 2006


[16] James T. McKenna, Report Cites Obstacles To Witness Interview, Aviation Week and Space Technology, December 15, 1997


[17] Don Van Natta Jr, Prime Evidence Found That Device Exploded in Cabin of Flight 800, The New York Times, August 23, 1996


[18] CNN, FBI: No criminal evidence behind TWA 800 crash, November 18, 1997


[19] Peter Lance, Triple Cross: How bin Laden’s Master Spy Penetrated
the CIA, the Green Berets, and the FBI – and Why Patrick Fitzgerald
Failed to Stop Him, Harper Collins Publishers, 2006


[20] Peter Lance, Triple Cross


[21] Patrick Fitzgerald, Testimony before 9/11 Commission, June 16, 2004, http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing12.htm


[22] Peter Dale Scott, The Road to 9/11: Wealth, Empire, and the
Future of America, University of California Press, 2007, p 152-160


[23] Richard Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror, Simon and Schuster, 2004


[24] Department of Justice news release, Federal Jury in Dallas
Convicts Holy Land Foundation and Its Leaders for Providing Material
Support to Hamas Terrorist Organization, November 24, 2008


[25] Peter Lance, 1000 Years for Revenge: International Terrorism and the FBI–the Untold Story, Harper Collins, 2003


[26] Peter Lance, 1000 Years for Revenge


[27] Peter Lance, Greg Scarpa Jr. A Mafia wiseguy uncovers a treasure trove of al Qaeda intel, http://peterlance.com/wordpress/?p=682


[28] Greg B. Smith, Panel told bureau rejected flight school warnings, new York Daily News, September 25, 2002


[29] History Commons Complete 9/11 Timeline, Profile for Ihab Ali NAwawi


[30] The Washington Post, Fbi’s Uneasy Role: Work In Lands With Brutal Police, October 29, 2000


[31] Tony Karon, The Curious Case of Hani al-Sayegh, TIME, Oct. 05, 1999


[32] Wikipedia page for Hani El-Sayegh


[33] Transcript of Hardball Special Edition, MSNBC, July 24, 2004, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5486840/


[34] History Commons Complete 9/11 Timeline, Profile for Omar Al-Bayoumi


[35] U.S. Justice Department office of Inspector General’s Inquiry into 9/11, http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0606/final.pdf


[36] Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11, Alfred A. Knopf, 2006, p 296


[37] FBI website, Veteran FBI Agent Arrested and Charged with Espionage, February 21, 2001


[38] Jerry Seper, Osama access to state secrets helped 9/11, Computer Crime Research Center, http://www.crime-research.org/news/2003/01/Mess0801.htm


[39] Jerry Seper, Osama access to state secrets helped 9/11


[40] Pierre-Henri Bunel, Al Qaeda: The Database, Centre for Research on Globalization, May 12, 2011, http://www.globalresearch.ca/al-qaeda-the-database/24738


[41] Jamey Hecht, PTech, 9/11, and USA-Saudi Terror – Part I, From The Wilderness Publications, 2005, http://www.fromthewilderness.com/free/ww3/012005_ptech_pt1.shtml


[42] History Commons Complete 9/11 Timeline, Profile for PTech Inc., http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=ptech_inc.


[43] United States v. Usama bin Laden et al., transcript of day 14, March 7, 2001, accessed at Cryptome, http://cryptome.org/usa-v-ubl-14.htm


[44] Kevin Fenton, Disconnecting the Dots: How CIA and FBI officials
helped enable 9/11 and evaded government investigations, Trine Day,
2011, p 220


[45] Transcript of Hardball Special Edition, MSNBC, July 24, 2004, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5486840/


[46] Brian Ross and Vic Walter, FBI Informant Says Agents Missed
Chance to Stop 9/11 Ringleader Mohammed Atta, ABC News, September 10,
2009


[47] Kevin Fenton, Disconnecting the Dots


[48] Transcript of Hardball Special Edition, MSNBC, July 24, 2004


[49] The Associated Press, FBI official made pre-9/11 comment linking Moussaoui, World Trade Center, 2005, accessed at: http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2002-09-24-moussaoui_x.htm


[50] Coleen Rowley’s Memo to FBI Director Robert Mueller, May 21, 2002


[51] U.S. Justice Department office of Inspector General’s Inquiry into 9/11,


[52] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004, p 539


[53] Transcript of Hardball Special Edition, MSNBC, July 24, 2004


[54] Transcript of Hardball Special Edition, MSNBC, July 24, 2004


[55] Julian Borger, Mystery men link Saudi intelligence to Sept 11 hijackers, The Guardian, November 24, 2002


[57] CNN, Text of Freeh’s statement


[58] David Johnston, Senators Angered After F.B.I. Says Weapons Are Missing The New York Times, July 18, 2001


[59] Ibid


[60] Ronald Kessler, The Bureau: The Secret History of the FBI, St. Martin’s Press, July 2002


[61] Statement of Louis J. Freeh, Former FBI Director, before the Joint Intelligence Committees, October 8, 2002,


[62] Brian Ross and Vic Walter, Called Off the Trail?: FBI Agents
Probing Terror Links Say They Were Told, ‘Let Sleeping Dogs Lie’, ABC
News, December 19, 2002


[63] 911Research.wtc7.net, Pentagon Attack Footage, http://911research.wtc7.net/pentagon/evidence/footage.html


[64] Daniel Hopsicker, Welcome to Terrorland: Mohamed Atta & the 9-11 Cover-up in Florida, MadCow Press, 2004


[65] History Commons Complete 9/11 Timeline, 11:30 p.m. September 11, 2001: FBI Uninterested in Flight 93 Witness’s Evidence, http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a1130fbiuninterested#a1130fbiuninterested


[66] Kevin R. Ryan, Demolition Access to the WTC Towers: Part Four – Cleanup, February 11, 2010, 911Review.com, http://www.911review.com/articles/ryan/demolition_access_p4.html


[67] James Risen, THREATS AND RESPONSES: THE INQUIRY; Congress Seeks
F.B.I. Data On Informer; F.B.I. Resists, The New York Times, October 06,
2002


[68] Kevin R. Ryan, Abu Zubaydah Poses a Real Threat to Al Qaeda, DigWithin.net, October 15, 2012


[69] Philip Shenon, The Commission: The Uncensored History of the 9/11 Investigation, Hachette Book Group, 2008


[70] Kevin R. Ryan, Evidence for Informed Trading on the Attacks of September 11, Foreign Policy Journal, November 18, 2010, http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2010/11/18/evidence-for-informed-trading-on-the-attacks-of-september-11/


Billionaires Make War on Iran And the United States Government is Helping | Campaign Against Sanctions and Military Intervention in Iran

Billionaires Make War on Iran And the United States Government is Helping | Campaign Against Sanctions and Military Intervention in Iran



Billionaires Make War on Iran And the United States Government is Helping







by Philip Giraldi (source: UNZ Review)
Wednesday, August 27, 2014
There is a group of Jewish American billionaires who are
apparently doing their best to make sure than negotiations with Iran go
nowhere in the mistaken belief that they are doing what is best for
Israel. And they would also appear to be assisted in their efforts by
the White House, which is at the same time claiming that it wants the
talks to be successful. The odd relationship is currently playing out
in a Manhattan courtroom
where the Justice Department is seeking to squash a lawsuit that it
fears might expose the extent to which the government has hypocritically
played fast and loose with classified information while simultaneously
sending journalists and whistleblowers to jail over allegations that
they have done the same.


The power and wealth of the anti-Iran groups as well as their
unrivalled access to the United States government means that a policy of
détente with Iran, which would be a no brainer based on both American
and Iranian interests, only proceeds by fits and starts with the US
Congress and much of the media lined up solidly to stop the effort. The
American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and its affiliated
educational foundation, which have focused on the “Iranian threat” over
the past three years, have a combined budget of more than $90 million while AIPAC’s spin-off the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) has $8.7 million.


The American Enterprise Institute’s (AEI) efforts are more
diversified but uniformly hawkish when it comes to the Middle East. It
has a budget of $45 million. Identified
multi-million dollar donor/supporters of AIPAC, AEI, and WINEP include
Sheldon Adelson of Las Vegas Sands, Paul Singer of Elliot Management
hedge fund and Bernard Marcus of Home Depot.


Other right wing think tanks including Heritage and Hudson in
Washington also support unrelenting pressure directed against Iran. Even
the more centrist Brookings Institute is hard core
when it comes to Middle Eastern politics by virtue of its Saban
Institute funded by Israeli-American billionaire Haim Saban. And then
there are the mainstream Jewish organizations to include the Anti
Defamation League, the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish
Organizations and the American Jewish Congress, all of which have vast
resources and unparalleled access to the White House, Congress and the
media.


All the pro-Israel anti-Iran groups engage in pressure tactics on
Capitol Hill and have been effective in dominating the political debate.
Of thirty-six outside witnesses
brought in to testify at seven Senate hearings on Iran since 2012 only
one might be characterized as sensitive to Iranian concerns. The
enormous lobbying effort enables the anti-Iran groups to define the
actual policies, move their drafts of legislation through congress, and
eventually see their bills pass with overwhelming majorities in both
the House and Senate. It is democracy in action if one accepts that
popular rule ought to be guided by money and pressure groups rather
than by national interests.


Less well known is United Against Nuclear Iran,
which has a budget just shy of $2 million. UANI is involved in the New
York lawsuit. The group, which has somehow obtained a 501[c]3
“educational” tax status that inter alia allows it to conceal
its donors, has offices in Rockefeller Center in New York City. It is
active on Capitol Hill providing “expert testimony” on Iran for
congressional committees, to include “help” in drafting legislation. At a
July Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Iran all three
outside witnesses were from UANI. It is also active in the media but
is perhaps best known for its “name and shame” initiatives in which it
exposes companies that it claims are doing business with Tehran in
violation of US sanctions.


UANI is being sued
by a Greek billionaire Victor Restis whom it had outed in 2013.
Restis, claiming the exposure was fraudulent and carried out to damage
his business, has filed suit demanding that UANI and billionaire Thomas
Kaplan turn over documents and details of relationships regarding UANI
donors who it is claimed are linked to the case. Kaplan, a New York
City resident, made his initial fortune on energy exploration and
development. More recently he has been involved in commodities trading
in precious metals. His wife Daphne is Israeli and his involvement
in various Jewish philanthropies both in the US and in Israel have
invited comparison with controversial deceased commodities trader Marc
Rich, who reportedly worked closely with the Israeli government on a number of projects.


The Justice department would like to the see the UANI lawsuit go away
as it is aware that what is being described as “law enforcement”
documents would include both privileged and classified Treasury
Department work product relating to individuals and companies that it
has investigated for sanctions busting. Passing either intelligence
related or law enforcement documents to a private organization is
illegal but the Justice Department’s only apparent concern is that the
activity might be exposed. There is no indication that it would go after
UANI for having acquired the information and it perhaps should be
presumed that the source of the leak is the Treasury Department itself.


Who or what provided the documents to a private advocacy group that
is also a tax exempt foundation supported by prominent businessmen with
interests in the Middle East is consequently not completely clear but
Restis is assuming that the truth will out if he can get hold of the
evidence. The lawsuit claims that UANI intimidates its targets by
defaming their business practices as well as by demanding both examination of their books and an audit carried out by one of its own accountants followed by review from an “independent counsel.”


Kaplan is named in the suit as he appears to be the gray eminence behind UANI. He once boasted
“we’ve (UANI) done more to bring Iran to heel than any other private
sector initiative.” Kaplan also employs as a director or officer in six
of his companies the Executive Director of UANI Mark Wallace and reportedly arranged the awarding of the Executive Director position at Harvard’s Belfer Center to its President Gary Samore.


Kaplan is a business competitor to Restis, whose lawyers are
apparently seeking to demonstrate two things: first, that the US
government has been feeding sometimes only partially vetted information
to UANI to help in its “name and shame” program and second, that UANI
is itself supported by partisan business interests like Kaplan as well
as by foreign sources, which apparently is meant to imply Israel. Or
even the Israeli intelligence service Mossad. Meir Dagan, former head
of Mossad, is on the UANI advisory board, which also includes
ex-Senator Joseph Lieberman and former Senior Diplomat Dennis Ross,
both of whom have frequently been accused of favoring Israeli interests
and both of whom might well have easy access to US government
generated information.


And then there is the Muhadedin-e-Khalq, the Iranian terrorist group that has assassinated at least six Americans and is now assisting the Israeli government in killing Iranian scientists, a prima facie definition
of what constitutes terrorism. The group was on the State Department
terrorist list from 1997 until 2012, when Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton de-listed it in response to demands coming from friends of
Israel in Congress as well as from a large group of ex government
officials, many of whom were paid large honoraria by the group to serve
as advocates. The paid American shills included
former CIA Directors James Woolsey and Porter Goss, New York City
Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, former Vermont Governor Howard Dean, former
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Louis Freeh and former
United Nations Ambassador John Bolton. The promoters of MEK in congress
and elsewhere claimed to be primarily motivated by MEK’s being an
enemy of the current regime in Tehran, though its virulent
anti-Americanism and terrorist history make it a somewhat unlikely
poster child for the “Iranian resistance.”


Supporters of MEK also ignore the fact
that the group is run like a cult, routinely executes internal
dissidents, and has virtually no political support within Iran. But such
are the ways of the corrupt Washington punditocracy, lionizing an
organization that it should be shunning. MEK’s political arm is located
in Paris and it has long been assumed that it is funded by the Israeli
government and by at least some of the same gaggle of billionaires,
possibly including their Israeli counterparts, who support the
anti-Iranian agenda in the United States.


Iranian negotiators have accepted that their country should have only
limited uranium enrichment capabilities coupled with a rigorous
inspection regime but the talks in Geneva drag on and on as the United
States continues to hesitate, raising new objections regularly in spite
of claims that it operates in good faith and seeks a settlement. That
an agreement is within reach is undoubtedly true and it would even be
good for Israel as it would remove the regional nuclear option while
making much less likely another pointless and devastating war. But the
men who write the checks do not see it that way and, unfortunately,
they are the ones who all too often both pay the piper and call the
tune.

Tuesday 19 August 2014

Best of TomDispatch: Ann Jones, In Bed With the U.S. Army | TomDispatch

Best of TomDispatch: Ann Jones, In Bed With the U.S. Army | TomDispatch





Here Be Dragons MRAPs, Sprained Ankles, Air Conditioning, Farting Contests, and Other Snapshots from the American War in Afghanistan 
By Ann Jones


In the eight years I’ve reported on Afghanistan, I’ve “embedded”
regularly with Afghan civilians, especially women. Recently, however,
with American troops “surging” and journalists getting into the swing of
the military’s counterinsurgency “strategy” (better known by its
acronym, COIN), I decided to get with the program as well. Last June, I
filed a request to embed with the U.S. Army.


Polite emails from Army public affairs specialists ask journalists to
provide evidence of medical insurance, a requirement I took as an
admission that war is not a healthy pursuit. I already knew that, of
course -- from the civilian side.  Plus I’d read a lot of articles and
books by male colleagues who had risked their necks with American troops
in Iraq and Afghanistan.  What struck me about their work was this:
even when they described screw-ups coming down from the top brass, those
reporters still managed to make the soldierly enterprise sound pretty
consistently heroic.  I wondered what they might be leaving out.




So I sent in a scan of my Medicare card.  I worried that this
evidence of my senior citizenship, coupled with my membership in the
“weaker sex,” the one we’re supposedly rescuing in Afghanistan, would
raise questions about my fitness for missions “outside the wire” of a
Forward Operating Base (FOB, pronounced "fob") in eastern Afghanistan
only a few miles from the tribal areas of Pakistan. But no, I got my
requested embed -- proof of neither fitness nor heroism required
(something my male colleagues had never revealed).  In the end, my age
and gender were no handicap. As Agatha Christie’s Miss Marple knows,
people will say almost anything to an old lady they assume to be stupid.


Boys and Their Toys


Having been critical of American policies from the get-go, I saw
nothing on the various Army bases I visited to change my mind.  One day
at that FOB, preparing to go on a mission, the sergeant in charge wrote
the soldiers’ names on the board, followed by “Terp” to designate the
Afghan-American interpreter who would accompany us, and “In Bed,” which
meant me.  He made a joke about reporters who are more gung-ho than
soldiers.  Not me.  And I wasn’t alone.  I had already met a lot of
older guys on other bases, mostly reservists who had jobs at home they
felt passionately about -- teachers, coaches, musicians -- and wives and
children they loved, who just wanted to go home.  One said to me,
“Maybe if I were ten years younger I could get into it, but I’m not a
boy anymore.”


The
Army had sent me a list of ground rules for reporters -- mostly
commonsense stuff like don’t print troop strength or battle plans. I
also got a checklist of things to bring along.  It was the sort of list
moms get when sending their kids off to camp: water bottle, flashlight,
towel, soap, toilet paper (for those excursions away from base),
sleeping bag, etc.  But there was other stuff too: ballistic eyewear,
fireproof gloves, big knife, body armor, and Kevlar helmet.  Considering
how much of my tax dollar goes to the Pentagon, I thought the Army
might have a few spare flak jackets to lend to visiting reporters, but
no, you have to bring your own.


That was perhaps a sign of things to come, as I was soon swamped by
complaints from soldiers and civilian contractors alike: not enough
armor, not enough vehicles, not enough helicopters, not enough weapons,
not enough troops -- and even when there seemed to be plenty of
everything, complaints that nothing was of quite the right kind. This
struck me as a peculiarly privileged American problem that seemed to
underlie almost everything I was to see on the eastern front of this
war.  Those complaints, in fact, seemed to spring from the very nature
of the American military enterprise -- from its toxic mix of paranoia,
entitlement, and good intentions.


Take the paranoia, which I suppose comes with the territory.  You
wouldn’t be there if you didn’t think that there were enemies all
around.  I turned down a military flight for the short hop from the
Afghan capital Kabul to Bagram, the main American base -- a rapidly
expanding “city” of more than 30,000 people.  Instead, I asked an Afghan
friend to drive me out in his car.


A Public Affairs officer warned me that driving was “very dangerous,”
but the only problem we met was a U.S. military convoy headed in the
opposite direction, holding up traffic.  For more than an hour we sat by
the highway with dozens of Afghan motorists watching a parade of
enormous flatbed trucks hauling other big vehicles: bulldozers and
armored personnel carriers of various vintages from Humvees to MRAPs
(Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected vehicles). My friend said, “We don’t
understand.  They have all these big machines.  They put them on trucks
and haul them up and down the road. Why?”


I couldn’t get an answer, but I got a clue when I took an Army
chopper from Bagram to a smaller base and met a private contractor
partly responsible for Army vehicle maintenance.  He gave me a CD to
pass on to his foreman at the FOB I was headed for.  Rather than music,
it held an instruction manual for repairing the latest model M-ATV, a
hulking personnel carrier with a V-shaped hull designed to repel the
blast of roadside bombs.  These are currently replacing the older MRAPs
and deadly low-slung Humvees.  The Humvees are, in turn, being passed
off to the Afghan National Army, whose soldiers are more expendable than
ours.  (You see what I mean about entitlement.)  Standing in a lot full
of new M-ATVs already in need of fixing, the foreman seemed pleased
indeed to get that CD.


It’s a measure of our sense of entitlement, I think, that while the
Taliban and their allies still walk to war wearing traditional baggy
cotton pants and shirts, we Americans incessantly invent things to make
ourselves more “secure.” Since no one can ever be secure, least of all
in war, every new development is bound to prove insufficient and almost
guaranteed to create new problems.


Still, Americans feel entitled to safety.  Hence the MRAP was
designed to address a double whammy of fear: roadside bombs (IEDs) and
ambushes.  I was trained to be a passenger in an MRAP for a mission that
never materialized, but in the process I learned where the built-in
handholds are for those frequent occasions when the top-heavy MRAP rolls
down a mountainside.


The trainer talked so assuredly about what to do in case of a
rollover that he almost gave me the impression you could swivel your
hips and right the vehicle, like a kayak.  But no, once it rolls, it’s a
goner.  You have to crawl out and walk.  (So much for ambush
protection.)  Then, one of those big trucks we saw on the highway to
Bagram has to come out and haul it back to base, where the foreman with
that new instruction-manual CD may have a go at fixing it.  That, in a
nutshell, is why the 7-passenger MRAP is being replaced by the
5-passenger M-ATV, a huge armored all-terrain vehicle not quite so
inclined to tip over.   Because it holds fewer soldiers, however, you
have to put more of those vehicles on the road, and I’m sure you already
see where that leads.


One benefit of our addiction to expensive, state-of-the-art stuff,
however faulty it may prove, is that the private manufacture of
armaments now helps keep our economy on life support and makes some
military-industrial types rich.  One drawback is that -- though it’s a
hard point for American soldiers in the line of fire to grasp -- it
actually undercuts our heralded COIN strategy.  Afghans out there
fighting in their cotton pajamas take Western reliance on heavy armor as
a measure of our fear -- not to mention the inferiority of our gods on
whose protection we appear unwilling to rely.  (By contrast, the
watchman at the small Afghan National Army base adjacent to the FOB I
was visiting slept on a cot on the roof, exposed to enemy fire with his
tea kettle beside him, either trusting his god, or maybe knowing
something we don’t about the “enemy.”)


All the Comforts of War


On the great scale of American bases, think of Bagram as a city,
secondary bases as small towns, FOBs as heavily gated communities in
rural landscapes, and outlying COPs (Combat Outposts) as camps you
wouldn’t want your kid to go to.  A FOB is, by definition, pretty far
out there on the fringe, but I have to say straight out that when the
chopper dropped me off in full (and remarkably heavy) body armor and
Kevlar helmet at my designated FOB, it didn’t look at all like “the
front” to me.


I should explain that my enduring image of war comes from the
trenches of World War I, from which my father returned with a lot of
medals, lifelong disabilities, and horrific picture books I wasn’t
allowed to see as a child.  In that war, men lived for months on end
without a change of uniform, in muddy or frozen trenches, infested with
rats and lice, often amid their own excrement and their own dead.


The frontline FOB where I landed and its soldiers, by contrast, are
spic-and-span.  Credit for this goes largely to the remarkably
inexpensive labor of crews of Filipinos, Indians, Croatians, and others
lured from distant lands by American for-profit private contractors
responsible for making our troops feel at home away from home.  The
base’s streets are laid out on a grid.  Tents in tidy rows are banked
with standard sandbags and their super-sized cousins, towering Hescos
filled with rocks and rubble.


The tents are cooled by roaring tornados of air conditioning, thanks
to equipment fueled by gasoline that costs the Army about $400 per
gallon to import.  It takes fuelers three to four hours every day to
refill all the giant generators that keep the cold air coming, so I felt
guilty when, to prevent shivering in my sleep, I stuffed my towel into
the ducts suspended from the ceiling of my tent.


More permanent buildings are going up and some, already built by
Afghans and deemed not good enough for American habitation, are
scheduled for reconstruction.  Even in distant FOBs like this one, the
building boom is prodigious.  There’s a big gym with the latest
body-building equipment, and a morale-boosting center equipped with
telephones and banks of computers connected to the Internet that are
almost always in use.  A 24/7 chow hall serves barbequed ribs, steak,
and lobster tails, though everything is cooked beyond recognition by
those underpaid laborers to whom this cuisine is utterly foreign.


There’s a remarkably speedy laundry and, as for the toilets and
showers -- I can speak only for those few designated “Female” -- they
were the best I’d seen anywhere in Afghanistan.  A sign politely
suggested limiting your shower to five minutes, a nod to the expense of
paying for-profit contractors to hire truckers to haul in the necessary
water, and then haul out to undisclosed locations the copious effluence
of American latrines.  (At Bagram, that effluence goes into a
conveniently nearby river, a water source for countless Afghans.)  The
other detritus from this expanding FOB is dumped into a pit and burned,
including a staggering, but undisclosed, number of plastic water
bottles.  All this helps explain the annual cost of maintaining a single
American soldier in Afghanistan, currently estimated at one million
dollars.


Don’t get me wrong.  I’m not making a case for filthy trenches.  But
why should war be gussied up like home?  If war were undisguisedly as
nasty and brutish as it truly is, it might also tend to be short. 
Soldiers freed from illusions might mutiny, as many did in Vietnam, or
desert and go home.  But this modern, cushier kind of pseudo-war is
different.


Many young soldiers told me that they actually live better in the
Army, even when deployed, than they did in civilian life, where they
couldn’t make ends meet, especially when they were trying to pay for
college or raise a family by working one or two low-wage jobs.  They
won’t mutiny.  They’re doing better than many of their friends back
home. (And they’re dutiful, which makes for acts of personal heroism,
even in a foolhardy cause.)  They are likely to reenlist, though many
told me they’d prefer to quit the Army and go to work for much higher
pay with the for-profit private contractors that now “service” American
war. 


But the odd thing is that no one seems to question the relative
cushiness of this life at war (nor the inequity of the hardscrabble
civilian life left behind) -- least of all those best able to observe
firsthand the contrast between our garrisons and the humble equipment
and living conditions of Afghans, both friend and foe.  Rather, the
contrast seems to inspire many soldiers with renewed appreciation of
“our American way of life” and a determination to “do good things” for
the Afghan people, just as many feel they did for the people of Iraq.


I emphasize all this because nothing I’d read about soldiering
prepared me for the extent of these comforts -- or the tedium that
attends them.  Plenty of soldiers don’t leave the base.  They hold down
desk jobs, issue supplies, manage logistics, repair vehicles or radios,
refuel generators and trucks, plan “development” projects, handle public
affairs, or update tactical maps inscribed (at certain locations I am
obliged not to name) with admonitions like “Here Be Dragons” or “Here Do
Bad Stuff.”  They face the boredom of ordinary, unheroic, repetitive
tasks.


The most common injury they are likely to suffer is a sprained ankle,
thanks to eastern Afghanistan’s carpet of loose rocks -- just the size
to trip you up. On the wall in the FOB medics’ clinic is a poster with
schematic drawings and instructions for strengthening ankles, an
anatomical part not enhanced by any of the fitness machines at the gym. 
The medics dispense a lot of ibuprofen and keep a supply of crutches
handy.


What’s Going On 


As this is an infantry base, however, most squads regularly venture
outside the wire and the characteristic, probably long-term disability
the soldiers take with them is bad knees -- from the great weight of the
things they wear and carry. The base commander reminded me of one of
the principles of COIN: security should be established by non-lethal
means.  So most infantry missions are “presence patrols,” described by
one officer as “walking around in places where we won’t get shot at just
to show the Afs [Afghans] that we’re keeping them safe.”


I went outside the wire myself on one of these presence patrols, a
mission to a village, and -- I’m sorry to say -- it was no friendly
stroll.  It’s a soldier’s job to be “focused”; that is, to watch out for
enemies.  So you can’t be “distracted” by greeting people along the way
or stopping to chat.  Entering a village hall to meet elders, for
instance, may sound cordial -- winning hearts and minds.  But sweeping
in with guns at the ready shatters that friendly feeling. Speaking as
someone who has visited Afghans in their homes for years, I have to say
that this approach does not make a good impression.  It probably
wouldn’t go over well in your hometown either. 


Nor does it seem to work. Since the U.S. military adopted COIN to
“protect the populace,” civilian casualties have gone up 23%; 6,000
Afghan civilians were killed last year (and that’s undoubtedly an
undercount). No wonder the presence of American troops leaves so many
Afghans feeling not safer, but more endangered, and it even inspires
some to take up arms against the occupying army.  Ever more often, at
least in the area where I was embedded, a non-lethal presence patrol
turns into a lethal firefight.


One day, near the end of my embed, I watched a public affairs officer
frame a photograph of a soldier who had been killed in a firefight and
mount it on the wall by the commander’s office beside the black-framed
photos of seven other soldiers. This American fighting force had been in
place at the FOB for only a few weeks, having relieved another
contingent, yet it had already lost eight men.  (Five Afghan soldiers
had been killed as well, but their pictures were notably absent from the
gallery of remembrance.)  The Army takes a photograph of every soldier
at the beginning of his or her service, so it’s on file when needed;
when, that is, a soldier is killed.


Most American bases and combat outposts are named for dead American
soldiers.  When a soldier is killed -- or “falls,” as the Army likes to
put it -- the Internet service and the phones on base go dead until an
Army delegation has knocked on the door of surviving family members.  So
even if you’re one of those soldiers who never leaves the base, you’re
always reminded of what’s going on out there. And then usually toward
evening, some unseen enemies on the peaks around the base begin to shoot
down at it, and American gunners respond with shells that lift great
clouds of rock and dust from the mountains into the darkening sky.


Doing Good to Afghans


On the base, I heard incessant talk about COIN, the “new” doctrine
resurrected from the disaster of Vietnam in the irrational hope that it
will work this time.  From my experience at the FOB, however, it’s clear
enough that the hearts-and-minds part of COIN is already dead in the
water, and one widespread practice in the military that’s gone
unreported by other embedded journalists helps explain why.  So here’s a
TomDispatch exclusive, courtesy of Afghan-American men serving as
interpreters for the soldiers.  They were embarrassed to the point of
agony when mentioning this habit, but desperate to put a stop to it. 
COIN calls for the military to meet and make friends with village
elders, drink tea, plan “development,” and captivate their hearts and
minds.  Several interpreters told me, however, that every meeting
includes some young American soldiers whose locker-room-style male
bonding features bouts of hilarious farting.


To Afghan men, nothing is more shameful. A fart is proof that a man
cannot control any of his apparatus below the belt.  The man who farts
is thus not a man at all.  He cannot be taken seriously, nor can any of
his ideas or promises or plans.


Blissfully unaware of such things, the Army goes on planning together
with its civilian consultants (representatives of the State Department,
the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and various independent contractors
who make up what’s called a Human Terrain Team charged with
interpreting local culture and helping to win the locals over to our
side).  Some speak of “building infrastructure,” others of advancing
“good governance” or planning “economic development.”  All talk of
“doing good” and “helping” Afghanistan.


In a typical mess-up on the actual terrain of Afghanistan, Army
experts previously in charge of this base had already had a
million-dollar suspension bridge built over a river some distance away,
but hadn’t thought to secure land rights, so no road leads to it.  Now
the local American agriculture specialist wants to introduce alfalfa to
these waterless, rocky mountains to feed herds of cattle principally
pastured in his mind.


Yet even as I was filling my notebook with details of their
delusionary schemes, the base commander told me he had already been
forced to “put aside development.”  He had his hands full facing a
Taliban onslaught he hadn’t expected.  Throughout Afghanistan, insurgent
attacks have gone up 51% since the official adoption of COIN as the
strategy du jour.  On this eastern front, where the commander
had served six years earlier, he now faces a “surge” of intimidation,
assassination, suicide attacks, roadside bombs, and fighters with
greater technical capability than he has ever seen in Afghanistan.


A few days after we spoke, the Afghanistan command was handed to
General Petraeus, the sainted refurbisher of the military's
counterinsurgency manual.  I wonder if the base commander has told
Petraeus yet what he told me then: “What we’re fighting here now -- it’s
a conventional war.”


I’d been “on the front” of this war for less than two weeks, and I
already needed a vacation.  Being outside the wire had filled me with
sorrow as I watched earnest, heavily armed and armored boys try to win
over white-bearded Afghans -- men of extraordinary dignity -- who have
seen all this before and know the outcome.


Being on the base was tedious, often tense, and equally sorrowful at
times when soldiers fell. Then the base commander, on foot, escorted the
armored vehicles returning from a firefight on to the base the way a
bygone cavalry officer might enter a frontier fort, leading a riderless
horse.  The scene would look good in a Hollywood war movie: moving in
that sentimental Technicolor way that seems to imbue with heroic
significance unnecessary and pointless death.


One night I bedded down outdoors under a profusion of stars and an
Islamic crescent moon.  Invisible in the dark, I couldn’t help
overhearing a soldier who’d slipped out to make a cell phone call back
home.  “I really need to talk to you today,” he said, and then stumbling
in his search for words, he broke down.  “No,” he said at last, “I’m
fine.  I’ll call you back later.”


The next day, carrying my helmet and my armor on my arm, I boarded a helicopter and flew away.


Ann Jones, a TomDispatch regular, is the author of Kabul in Winter, among other books, and most recently They Were Soldiers: How the Wounded Return From America’s Wars -- The Untold Story, a Dispatch Books project (Haymarket, 2013).



http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175879/best_of_tomdispatch%3A_ann_jones%2C_in_bed_with_the_u.s._army/#more

 

Monday 18 August 2014

Tomgram: Matthew Harwood, One Nation Under SWAT | TomDispatch

Tomgram: Matthew Harwood, One Nation Under SWAT | TomDispatch







To Terrify and Occupy: How the Excessive Militarization of the Police is Turning Cops Into Counterinsurgents
   
By Matthew Harwood

    Jason Westcott was afraid.

    One night last fall, he discovered via Facebook that a friend of a friend was planning with some co-conspirators to break in to his home. They were intent on stealing Wescott's handgun and a couple of TV sets. According to the Facebook message, the suspect was planning on “burning” Westcott, who promptly called the Tampa Bay police and reported the plot.

    According to the Tampa Bay Times, the investigating officers responding to Westcott’s call had a simple message for him: “If anyone breaks into this house, grab your gun and shoot to kill.”

    Around 7:30 pm on May 27th, the intruders arrived. Westcott followed the officers’ advice, grabbed his gun to defend his home, and died pointing it at the intruders.  They used a semiautomatic shotgun and handgun to shoot down the 29-year-old motorcycle mechanic.  He was hit three times, once in the arm and twice in his side, and pronounced dead upon arrival at the hospital.

    The intruders, however, weren’t small-time crooks looking to make a small score. Rather they were members of the Tampa Police Department’s SWAT team, which was executing a search warrant on suspicion that Westcott and his partner were marijuana dealers. They had been tipped off by a confidential informant, whom they drove to Westcott’s home four times between February and May to purchase small amounts of marijuana, at $20-$60 a pop. The informer notified police that he saw two handguns in the home, which was why the Tampa police deployed a SWAT team to execute the search warrant.

    In the end, the same police department that told Westcott to protect his home with defensive force killed him when he did. After searching his small rental, the cops indeed found weed, two dollars' worth, and one legal handgun -- the one he was clutching when the bullets ripped into him.

    Welcome to a new era of American policing, where cops increasingly see themselves as soldiers occupying enemy territory, often with the help of Uncle Sam’s armory, and where even nonviolent crimes are met with overwhelming force and brutality.

    The War on Your Doorstep

    The cancer of militarized policing has long been metastasizing in the body politic.  It has been growing ever stronger since the first Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams were born in the 1960s in response to that decade’s turbulent mix of riots, disturbances, and senseless violence like Charles Whitman’s infamous clock-tower rampage in Austin, Texas.

    While SWAT isn’t the only indicator that the militarization of American policing is increasing, it is the most recognizable. The proliferation of SWAT teams across the country and their paramilitary tactics have spread a violent form of policing designed for the extraordinary but in these years made ordinary. When the concept of SWAT arose out of the Philadelphia and Los Angeles Police Departments, it was quickly picked up by big city police officials nationwide.  Initially, however, it was an elite force reserved for uniquely dangerous incidents, such as active shooters, hostage situations, or large-scale disturbances.

    Nearly a half-century later, that’s no longer true.

    In 1984, according to Radley Balko's Rise of the Warrior Cop, about 26% of towns with populations between 25,000 and 50,000 had SWAT teams. By 2005, that number had soared to 80% and it’s still rising, though SWAT statistics are notoriously hard to come by.

    As the number of SWAT teams has grown nationwide, so have the raids. Every year now, there are approximately 50,000 SWAT raids in the United States, according to Professor Pete Kraska of Eastern Kentucky University’s School of Justice Studies. In other words, roughly 137 times a day a SWAT team assaults a home and plunges its inhabitants and the surrounding community into terror.

    Upping the Racial Profiling Ante

    In a recently released report, “War Comes Home,” the American Civil Liberties Union (my employer) discovered that nearly 80% of all SWAT raids it reviewed between 2011 and 2012 were deployed to execute a search warrant.

    Pause here a moment and consider that these violent home invasions are routinely used against people who are only suspected of a crime. Up-armored paramilitary teams now regularly bash down doors in search of evidence of a possible crime. In other words, police departments increasingly choose a tactic that often results in injury and property damage as its first option, not the one of last resort. In more than 60% of the raids the ACLU investigated, SWAT members rammed down doors in search of possible drugs, not to save a hostage, respond to a barricade situation, or neutralize an active shooter.

    On the other side of that broken-down door, more often than not, are blacks and Latinos. When the ACLU could identify the race of the person or people whose home was being broken into, 68% of the SWAT raids against minorities were for the purpose of executing a warrant in search of drugs. When it came to whites, that figure dropped to 38%, despite the well-known fact that blacks, whites, and Latinos all use drugs at roughly the same rates. SWAT teams, it seems, have a disturbing record of disproportionately applying their specialized skill set within communities of color.

    Think of this as racial profiling on steroids in which the humiliation of stop and frisk is raised to a terrifying new level.

    Everyday Militarization

    Don’t think, however, that the military mentality and equipment associated with SWAT operations are confined to those elite units. Increasingly, they’re permeating all forms of policing.

    As Karl Bickel, a senior policy analyst with the Justice Department’s Community Policing Services office, observes, police across America are being trained in a way that emphasizes force and aggression. He notes that recruit training favors a stress-based regimen that’s modeled on military boot camp rather than on the more relaxed academic setting a minority of police departments still employ. The result, he suggests, is young officers who believe policing is about kicking ass rather than working with the community to make neighborhoods safer. Or as comedian Bill Maher reminded officers recently: “The words on your car, ‘protect and serve,’ refer to us, not you.”

    This authoritarian streak runs counter to the core philosophy that supposedly dominates twenty-first-century American thinking: community policing.  Its emphasis is on a mission of “keeping the peace” by creating and maintaining partnerships of trust with and in the communities served. Under the community model, which happens to be the official policing philosophy of the U.S. government, officers are protectors but also problem solvers who are supposed to care, first and foremost, about how their communities see them. They don’t command respect, the theory goes: they earn it. Fear isn’t supposed to be their currency. Trust is.

    Nevertheless, police recruiting videos, as in those from California’s Newport Beach Police Department and New Mexico’s Hobbs Police Department, actively play up not the community angle but militarization as a way of attracting young men with the promise of Army-style adventure and high-tech toys. Policing, according to recruiting videos like these, isn’t about calmly solving problems; it’s about you and your boys breaking down doors in the middle of the night.

    SWAT’s influence reaches well beyond that.  Take the increasing adoption of battle-dress uniforms (BDUs) for patrol officers. These militaristic, often black, jumpsuits, Bickel fears, make them less approachable and possibly also more aggressive in their interactions with the citizens they’re supposed to protect.

    A small project at Johns Hopkins University seemed to bear this out. People were shown pictures of police officers in their traditional uniforms and in BDUs. Respondents, the survey indicated, would much rather have a police officer show up in traditional dress blues. Summarizing its findings, Bickel writes, “The more militaristic look of the BDUs, much like what is seen in news stories of our military in war zones, gives rise to the notion of our police being an occupying force in some inner city neighborhoods, instead of trusted community protectors.”

    Where Do They Get Those Wonderful Toys?

    “I wonder if I can get in trouble for doing this,” the young man says to his buddy in the passenger seat as they film the Saginaw County Sheriff Office’s new toy: a Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle. As they film the MRAP from behind, their amateur video has a Red Dawn-esque feel, as if an occupying military were now patrolling this Michigan county’s streets. “This is getting ready for f**king crazy times, dude,” one young man comments. “Why,” his friend replies, “has our city gotten that f**king bad?”

    In fact, nothing happening in Saginaw County warranted the deployment of an armored vehicle capable of withstanding bullets and the sort of improvised explosive devices that insurgent forces have regularly planted along roads in America’s recent war zones.  Sheriff William Federspiel, however, fears the worst. "As sheriff of the county, I have to put ourselves in the best position to protect our citizens and protect our property," he told a reporter. "I have to prepare for something disastrous."

    Lucky for Federspiel, his exercise in paranoid disaster preparedness didn’t cost his office a penny. That $425,000 MRAP came as a gift, courtesy of Uncle Sam, from one of our far-flung counterinsurgency wars. The nasty little secret of policing’s militarization is that taxpayers are subsidizing it through programs overseen by the Pentagon, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Justice Department.

    Take the 1033 program. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) may be an obscure agency within the Department of Defense, but through the 1033 program, which it oversees, it’s one of the core enablers of American policing’s excessive militarization. Beginning in 1990, Congress authorized the Pentagon to transfer its surplus property free of charge to federal, state, and local police departments to wage the war on drugs. In 1997, Congress expanded the purpose of the program to include counterterrorism in section 1033 of the defense authorization bill. In one single page of a 450-page law, Congress helped sow the seeds of today’s warrior cops.

    The amount of military hardware transferred through the program has grown astronomically over the years. In 1990, the Pentagon gave $1 million worth of equipment to U.S. law enforcement. That number had jumped to nearly $450 million in 2013. Overall, the program has shipped off more than $4.3 billion worth of materiel to state and local cops, according to the DLA.

    In its recent report, the ACLU found a disturbing range of military gear being transferred to civilian police departments nationwide. Police in North Little Rock, Arkansas, for instance, received 34 automatic and semi-automatic rifles, two robots that can be armed, military helmets, and a Mamba tactical vehicle. Police in Gwinnet County, Georgia, received 57 semi-automatic rifles, mostly M-16s and M-14s. The Utah Highway Patrol, according to a Salt Lake City Tribune investigation, got an MRAP from the 1033 program, and Utah police received 1,230 rifles and four grenade launchers. After South Carolina’s Columbia Police Department received its very own MRAP worth $658,000, its SWAT Commander Captain E.M. Marsh noted that 500 similar vehicles had been distributed to law enforcement organizations across the country.

    Astoundingly, one-third of all war materiel parceled out to state, local, and tribal police agencies is brand new. This raises further disconcerting questions: Is the Pentagon simply wasteful when it purchases military weapons and equipment with taxpayer dollars? Or could this be another downstream, subsidized market for defense contractors? Whatever the answer, the Pentagon is actively distributing weaponry and equipment made for U.S. counterinsurgency campaigns abroad to police who patrol American streets and this is considered sound policy in Washington. The message seems striking enough: what might be necessary for Kabul might also be necessary for DeKalb County.

    In other words, the twenty-first-century war on terror has melded thoroughly with the twentieth-century war on drugs, and the result couldn’t be anymore disturbing: police forces that increasingly look and act like occupying armies.

    How the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice Are Up-Armoring the Police

    When police departments look to muscle up their arms and tactics, the Pentagon isn’t the only game in town. Civilian agencies are in on it, too.

    During a 2011 investigation, reporters Andrew Becker and G.W. Schulz discovered that, since 9/11, police departments watching over some of the safest places in America have used $34 billion in grant funding from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to militarize in the name of counterterrorism.

    In Fargo, North Dakota, for example, the city and its surrounding county went on an $8 million spending spree with federal money, according to Becker and Schulz. Although the area averaged less than two murders a year since 2005, every squad car is now armed with an assault rifle. Police also have access to Kevlar helmets that can stop heavy firepower as well as an armored truck worth approximately $250,000. In Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 1,500 beat cops have been trained to use AR-15 assault rifles with homeland security grant funding.

    As with the 1033 program, neither DHS nor state and local governments account for how the equipment, including body armor and drones, is used. While the rationale behind stocking up on these military-grade supplies is invariably the possibility of a terrorist attack, school shooting, or some other horrific event, the gear is normally used to conduct paramilitary drug raids, as Balko notes.

    Still, the most startling source of police militarization is the Department of Justice, the very agency officially dedicated to spreading the community policing model through its Community Oriented Policing Services office.

    In 1988, Congress authorized the Byrne grant programs in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, which gave state and local police federal funds to enlist in the government’s drug war. That grant program, according to Balko, led to the creation of regional and multi-jurisdictional narcotics task forces, which gorged themselves on federal money and, with little federal, state, or local oversight, spent it beefing up their weapons and tactics. In 2011, 585 of these task forces operated off of Byrne grant funding.

    The grants, Balko reports, also incentivized the type of policing that has made the war on drugs such a destructive force in American society. The Justice Department doled out Byrne grants based on how many arrests officers made, how much property they seized, and how many warrants they served. The very things these narcotics task forces did very well. “As a result,” Balko writes, “we have roving squads of drug cops, loaded with SWAT gear, who get money if they conduct more raids, make more arrests, and seize more property, and they are virtually immune to accountability if they get out of line.”

    Regardless of whether this militarization has occurred due to federal incentives or executive decision-making in police departments or both, police across the nation are up-armoring with little or no public debate. In fact, when the ACLU requested SWAT records from 255 law enforcement agencies as part of its investigation, 114 denied them. The justifications for such denials varied, but included arguments that the documents contained “trade secrets” or that the cost of complying with the request would be prohibitive. Communities have a right to know how the police do their jobs, but more often than not, police departments think otherwise.

    Being the Police Means Never Having to Say You’re Sorry

    Report by report, evidence is mounting that America’s militarized police are a threat to public safety. But in a country where the cops increasingly look upon themselves as soldiers doing battle day in, day out, there’s no need for public accountability or even an apology when things go grievously wrong.

    If community policing rests on mutual trust between the police and the people, militarized policing operates on the assumption of “officer safety” at all costs and contempt for anyone who sees things differently. The result is an “us versus them” mentality.

    Just ask the parents of Bou Bou Phonesavanh. Around 3:00 a.m. on May 28th, the Habersham County Special Response Team conducted a no-knock raid at a relative’s home near Cornelia, Georgia, where the family was staying. The officers were looking for the homeowner’s son, whom they suspected of selling $50 worth of drugs to a confidential informant.  As it happened, he no longer lived there.

    Despite evidence that children were present -- a minivan in the driveway, children’s toys littering the yard, and a Pack ‘n Play next to the door -- a SWAT officer tossed a “flashbang” grenade into the home. It landed in 19-month-old Bou Bou’s crib and exploded, critically wounding the toddler. When his distraught mother tried to reach him, officers screamed at her to sit down and shut up, telling her that her child was fine and had just lost a tooth. In fact, his nose was hanging off his face, his body had been severely burned, and he had a hole in his chest. Rushed to the hospital, Bou Bou had to be put into a medically induced coma.

    The police claimed that it was all a mistake and that there had been no evidence children were present. “There was no malicious act performed,” Habersham County Sheriff Joey Terrell told the Atlanta Journal-Constitution. “It was a terrible accident that was never supposed to happen.” The Phonesavanhs have yet to receive an apology from the sheriff’s office. “Nothing. Nothing for our son. No card. No balloon. Not a phone call. Not anything,” Bou Bou’s mother, Alecia Phonesavanh, told CNN.

    Similarly, Tampa Police Chief Jane Castor continues to insist that Jay Westcott’s death in the militarized raid on his house was his own fault.  "Mr. Westcott lost his life because he aimed a loaded firearm at police officers. You can take the entire marijuana issue out of the picture," Castor said. "If there's an indication that there is armed trafficking going on -- someone selling narcotics while they are armed or have the ability to use a firearm -- then the tactical response team will do the initial entry."

    In her defense of the SWAT raid, Castor simply dismissed any responsibility for Westcott’s death. “They did everything they could to serve this warrant in a safe manner,” she wrote the Tampa Bay Times -- “everything,” that is, but find an alternative to storming the home of a man they knew feared for his life.

    Almost half of all American households report having a gun, as the ACLU notes in its report. That means the police always have a ready-made excuse for using SWAT teams to execute warrants when less confrontational and less violent alternatives exist.

    In other words, if police believe you’re selling drugs, beware. Suspicion is all they need to turn your world upside down. And if they’re wrong, don’t worry; the intent couldn’t have been better.

    Voices in the Wilderness

    The militarization of the police shouldn’t be surprising. As Hubert Williams, a former police director of Newark, New Jersey, and Patrick V. Murphy, former commissioner of the New York City Police Department, put it nearly 25 years ago, police are “barometers of the society in which they operate.” In post-9/11 America, that means police forces imbued with the “hooah” mentality of soldiers and acting as if they are fighting an insurgency in their own backyard.

    While the pace of police militarization has quickened, there has at least been some pushback from current and former police officials who see the trend for what it is: the destruction of community policing. In Spokane, Washington, Councilman Mike Fagan, a former police detective, is pushing back against police officers wearing BDUs, calling the get-up “intimidating” to citizens. In Utah, the legislature passed a bill requiring probable cause before police could execute a no-knock raid. Salt Lake City Police Chief Chris Burbank has been a vocal critic of militarization, telling the local paper, “We’re not the military. Nor should we look like an invading force coming in.” Just recently, Chief Charlie Beck of the Los Angeles Police Department agreed with the ACLU and the Los Angeles Times editorial board that “the lines between municipal law enforcement and the U.S. military cannot be blurred.”

    Retired Seattle police chief Norm Stamper has also become an outspoken critic of militarizing police forces, noting “most of what police are called upon to do, day in and day out, requires patience, diplomacy, and interpersonal skills.” In other words, community policing. Stamper is the chief who green-lighted a militarized response to World Trade Organization protests in his city in 1999 (“The Battle in Seattle”). It’s a decision he would like to take back. “My support for a militaristic solution caused all hell to break loose,” he wrote in the Nation. “Rocks, bottles and newspaper racks went flying. Windows were smashed, stores were looted, fires lighted; and more gas filled the streets, with some cops clearly overreacting, escalating and prolonging the conflict.”

    These former policemen and law enforcement officials understand that police officers shouldn't be breaking down any citizen's door at 3 a.m. armed with AR-15s and flashbang grenades in search of a small amount of drugs, while an MRAP idles in the driveway. The anti-militarists, however, are in the minority right now. And until that changes, violent paramilitary police raids will continue to break down the doors of nearly 1,000 American households a week.

    War, once started, can rarely be contained.

http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175881/tomgram%3A_matthew_harwood%2C_one_nation_under_swat/