‘There’s
a deal of ruin in a nation,” said Adam Smith — and that goes double for
a continent. Sunday’s elections for the European parliament were an
important stage on the road to ruin, which has now been traveled for
almost 60 years, but they did not signal arrival at the final
destination. From the standpoint of both its founders and its critics,
that destination is a federal European state, and the transport system
taking us there is the so-called “functionalist” theory of integration.
Under this theory, Europe is supposed to be integrated function by
function — coal and steel production, trade diplomacy, trade in goods
and services, legal rules, police functions, defense, foreign policy,
currency, etc., etc. — until its peoples and governments wake up one
morning and realize that, Hey, we’re living in the same
state/country/nation/polity/whatever. Isn’t that great! Henry Kissinger
will be phoning any minute to congratulate us.
The
single most vital missing ingredient in the functionalist recipe,
however, is a European demos. “European” is no more than a geographical
expression. There are Frenchmen, Germans, Brits, Italians, and Dutchmen,
but there is no European people united by sentiment, common fellowship,
language, historical institutions, the mystic chords of memory, and a
sense of overriding vital mutual interests. There is the “vanguard” of a
possible future European people in the form of those politicians and
bureaucrats who go by the name of Eurocrats. But vanguards are no
guarantee of a successful future demos, as the dissolutions of the
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia illustrate horribly.
Without a
demos, however, functionalism eventually fails to function. It runs into
a crisis and it finds that it cannot call on the loyalty of its
citizens to solve it. Indeed, its creates a crisis by removing powers
from its constituent governments that the citizens would prefer at home.
Eventually it provokes a rebellion. And that is what arrived on Sunday.
For
the first 30 or so years of its existence, the European Union (which
went under various aliases, such as European Economic Community, for
much of the period) mainly pursued activities that were either mildly
beneficial (e.g., reduced barriers to trade) or temporarily soothing
(e.g., agricultural subsidies) or remote from everyday experience. Most
of the crises that European countries experienced in this period, such
as the Soviet threat, were unrelated to its existence. It rumbled on
functionally. Most people lived their lives without thinking much about
the EU.
After the Cold War ended, however, the treaties that
installed the single European market, the harmonization of European
regulations, and the single European currency meant that their lives
were increasingly interrupted and disturbed by decisions made in
Brussels. Tom Rogan has a very useful list of typical interventions in
his NRO article. What
irked people in individual countries, moreover, was that there seemed
to be no way they could repeal or obstruct new regulations that they
found expensive, burdensome, annoying, or simply unjust. National
governments claimed to be powerless before Brussels.
However
irritating this regulatory Saint Vitus’ dance was, though, no single
example ever seemed worth making a real fuss over. And those citizens
who did make a fuss — such as Britain’s “Metric Martyrs,” who objected
to the outlawing of the UK’s traditional weights and measures — could be
snidely dismissed as cranks, fined, and be forgotten. People did begin
voting for Euro-skeptic parties, but in small numbers that grew slowly
election by election. It seemed that it would require a massive
international crisis with all its attendant sufferings before the
functionalist model of integration could be stopped.
Three
years ago the euro — which up to that point had been celebrated as an
advance of civilization equal to the discovery of anaesthesia — began
its descent into crisis. Attempts to solve this crisis have imposed an
extraordinary degree of economic austerity on Mediterranean Europe and
serious exactions on the taxpayers of Northern Europe. The euro itself
has been preserved, but at the cost of high levels of unemployment and
economic waste seemingly without end. The EU’s solutions to the euro
crisis are worse than the crisis itself in their effects on ordinary
people. People are enraged that they are not allowed to obstruct or even
question the policies imposed by this functionalist express. In short,
the euro crisis woke up European voters to the undemocratic nature of
the European Union. Hence the rebellions in Sunday’s elections.
About
one third of Europe’s voters cast their ballots for
“anti-establishment” parties across Europe. These parties are very
different in different countries. The hard-right nationalism of France’s
Front National is very different from the welfare-state protectionism
of the Danish People’s Party, which is in turn different from the
free-trade, outward-looking liberalism of UKIP in Britain. But they are
all reacting to the failure of supranational, undemocratic
Euro-governance, and they all want the return of powers from Brussels to
national parliaments. They are expressing deep currents of opinion in
their respective countries, amounting in many, if not most, cases to
majority opinion.
years ago the euro — which up to that point had been celebrated as an
advance of civilization equal to the discovery of anaesthesia — began
its descent into crisis. Attempts to solve this crisis have imposed an
extraordinary degree of economic austerity on Mediterranean Europe and
serious exactions on the taxpayers of Northern Europe. The euro itself
has been preserved, but at the cost of high levels of unemployment and
economic waste seemingly without end. The EU’s solutions to the euro
crisis are worse than the crisis itself in their effects on ordinary
people. People are enraged that they are not allowed to obstruct or even
question the policies imposed by this functionalist express. In short,
the euro crisis woke up European voters to the undemocratic nature of
the European Union. Hence the rebellions in Sunday’s elections.
About
one third of Europe’s voters cast their ballots for
“anti-establishment” parties across Europe. These parties are very
different in different countries. The hard-right nationalism of France’s
Front National is very different from the welfare-state protectionism
of the Danish People’s Party, which is in turn different from the
free-trade, outward-looking liberalism of UKIP in Britain. But they are
all reacting to the failure of supranational, undemocratic
Euro-governance, and they all want the return of powers from Brussels to
national parliaments. They are expressing deep currents of opinion in
their respective countries, amounting in many, if not most, cases to
majority opinion.
If that is so, it is fair to ask: Why did the
Euro-establishment parties of Left and Right win two-thirds of the
seats in the Euro-parliament? The answer is that most ordinary people in
democratic societies develop a loyalty to established parties that goes
quite deep and remains a force even when the parties disappoint or
betray their supporters. Yet 5 million Spanish voters abandoned the two
major parties of the Spanish state; the Front National defeated the two
equivalent parties in France; and UKIP, led by Nigel Farage, is the
first insurgent party since 1910 to win a UK national election. These
are massive political facts signifying a deep national alienation that
also influences other regular supporters of the major parties — just not
to the extent of persuading them to abandon their customary loyalties
and switch to parties widely seen as, at the very least, not
respectable. At least for now.
Prudent leaders in national
politics recognize such earthquakes and trim policy accordingly. But the
leaders of the parties in the European parliament are the opposite of
prudent; they are fanatical devotees of the undemocratic process of
European integration that sparked the weekend revolts. They will work
together across the aisle in an unacknowledged “grand coalition” rather
than concede anything serious to the new arrivals. That will cause
tensions with their colleagues in national governments, who will want to
appease their publics’ opinions — which in most cases will be their own
domestic political supporters. But the likelihood is that although the
European parliament will become a more raucous and rowdy place, its
bipartisan-establishment majority will push ahead with “functionalist
integration,” euro and all, with the support of the European Commission
and its bureaucracies.
But since functionalism eventually fails to
function, there will be another crisis down the road, and a larger
electoral rebellion in response. And at some point the people will
defeat the vanguard. Just not this time.
Euro-establishment parties of Left and Right win two-thirds of the
seats in the Euro-parliament? The answer is that most ordinary people in
democratic societies develop a loyalty to established parties that goes
quite deep and remains a force even when the parties disappoint or
betray their supporters. Yet 5 million Spanish voters abandoned the two
major parties of the Spanish state; the Front National defeated the two
equivalent parties in France; and UKIP, led by Nigel Farage, is the
first insurgent party since 1910 to win a UK national election. These
are massive political facts signifying a deep national alienation that
also influences other regular supporters of the major parties — just not
to the extent of persuading them to abandon their customary loyalties
and switch to parties widely seen as, at the very least, not
respectable. At least for now.
Prudent leaders in national
politics recognize such earthquakes and trim policy accordingly. But the
leaders of the parties in the European parliament are the opposite of
prudent; they are fanatical devotees of the undemocratic process of
European integration that sparked the weekend revolts. They will work
together across the aisle in an unacknowledged “grand coalition” rather
than concede anything serious to the new arrivals. That will cause
tensions with their colleagues in national governments, who will want to
appease their publics’ opinions — which in most cases will be their own
domestic political supporters. But the likelihood is that although the
European parliament will become a more raucous and rowdy place, its
bipartisan-establishment majority will push ahead with “functionalist
integration,” euro and all, with the support of the European Commission
and its bureaucracies.
But since functionalism eventually fails to
function, there will be another crisis down the road, and a larger
electoral rebellion in response. And at some point the people will
defeat the vanguard. Just not this time.
No comments:
Post a Comment